From antisemitism to anti-Muslim racism: The evolving face of the far-right in Poland

By Steve Rose
On behalf of Faith Matters

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Introduction

The size of the nationalist march in Warsaw on 11 November 2017 brought renewed interest in far-right politics in Poland and its potential repercussions for community cohesion in Poland and abroad. In the United Kingdom, Poland is the most common non-UK country of birth for people living in the UK, and therefore, the potential repercussions are of added relevance and importance. In recent months, however, the Home Office has stopped far-right speakers from Poland from attending rallies in the UK. The fear that the far-right will seek to recruit Poles in Britain is not new but is perhaps reflective of a broader perception that Poland is shifting further to the right under the populist Law and Justice party (PiS). The PiS was, arguably, able to absorb support for the traditional far-right in Poland which signalled their political decline and irrelevance as the PiS dominated right-wing politics both in opposition, and when the PiS led a coalition government, which included the far-right as a junior partner in 2006. Reflective of this political change, other major far-right groups turned their attention to the independence day marches, incorporating more violent and hostile forms of political activism.

A noted figure in the Polish far-right, Marian Kowalski, was unable to speak in Ealing, west London after local police intervened to close down a restaurant for 48 hours. The danger, however, remains, that far-right speakers will seek to use traditional community spaces, be it restaurants or school buildings, to spread division and avoid media scrutiny. It took the combined efforts of local anti-racist activists within Polish communities to translate materials which we, in turn, passed to authorities to limit the reach of speakers like Kowalski. Nor should this success overshadow the deeper problem of monitoring the far-right in Polish communities given the obvious linguistic difficulties when monitoring social media accounts or their activities offline. The concern is how the mainstream continues to absorb far-right discourses into a broader populist anti-immigrant discourse. As Rafał Pankowski, a professor at Collegium Civitas in Warsaw, told the Guardian, not everyone on the Independence Day march was a member of the far-right, but they still marched under the banner of nationalism. It remains a concern that individuals from far-right groups in the UK have attempted to bring over extremists from Poland or have travelled to the country to participate in far-right rallies. Others have attempted to give far-right voices a larger audience outside of their native Poland with interviews conducted in English. A Polish supporter of Britain First drove his van at a Muslim man in north-west London on the

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5 Ibid. 161.
anniversary of the EU referendum vote on June 23. Marek Zakrocki, 48, was heard to have said that he intended to ‘kill a Muslim’ and CCTV footage captured him shouting about ‘white power’ and making Nazi salutes before he attempted to ram Kamal Ahmed with his van. Police found Britain First newspapers and flyers in his home in Harrow, and Zakrocki later admitted to donating money to the group.

A key lesson for cohesion and mutuality moving forward is how to incorporate interfaith dialogue. As Włoch (2009) notes, the Polish church has celebrated Islamic holidays, and some church authorities even criticised the publication of a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. Engaging with Jewish communities will further the dialogue of mutuality and help Poles confront more painful and problematic eras of their national history. Moreover, as Włoch alludes to, the discourse of ‘strangeness’ focuses upon cultural and national difference. It does not look at religious difference which offers scope to facilitate more faith-based dialogue in Polish communities.

**Review of Existing Literature**

Faith Matters is proud to launch a new community-focused project that will aim to empower Polish communities to challenge anti-Muslim narratives. This project launches with a briefing paper that will outline some of the key ideologues and political parties in Poland and how these individuals have exported such views to settled Polish communities in the UK.

This briefing paper seeks to explore why this form of Polish nationalism which so often distils into a form of ethnonationalism, where the position of ethnic origin overshadows other affiliations, differs from our traditional understanding of nationalism. As Pankowski (2010) argued, nationalism, in broad terms, is the understated backbone of mainstream politics in Poland, as many radical right parties will use the term to self-identify as ‘nationalist’ in popular political discourse, in the hope of drawing from the wellspring of this political tradition. A political space where historical identities and values supplant other interests.

Contemporary analysis speaks of the phenomena of ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’ in Poland given that Muslim communities account for less than 1% of the population. The Pew Research Center puts this figure at just 0.1%. Others argue this is merely a phantom or

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13 Ibid. 65.


15 Ibid. 8.

16 Ibid. 12.


platonic form of anti-Muslim racism, where hostile attitudes, fanned by negative press coverage grew among some communities who have no personal interactions with Muslims. For example, Włoch (2009) described how the Polish press ‘relished’ in lurid details of the building of a mosque in Italy or stories of Islamic clothing in France. Some have pointed to the role of salacious media reporting in the growth of Islamophobic attitudes in Poland following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States. Some, however, point to the end of mass censorship in 1989, and the rise of for-profit and privately owned mass media in Poland in the 1990s, as a watershed moment in how representations of Islam and Muslims shifted, a reversal of the positive relationships Communist Poland fostered with many Muslim-majority states. When interactions do occur, in particular with Polish converts, some report they have been accused of ‘betraying’ their culture or forced to defend tenets of their faith with misinformed strangers. For female converts, there was a suspicion among some, that they were seduced or forced into converting by Arab men.

This cultural phenomenon, while not exclusive to Poland, is antithetical to the Polish tradition of coexistence with their minority Muslim communities, and has intensified in some respects in recent years. Between 2005 and 2008, negative views of Muslims in Poland jumped from 30% to 46%, according to the Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project. Such hostile attitudes, moreover, appeared in the European Values Study, which, in that year, found that Poles favoured neighbours who had far-right views rather than having to live next to Muslims in 2008. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in 2010 found that Arabs (grouped as one cohort) are one the most disliked minority groups among Poles. Others highlight how Polish society views Islam through the lens of Arab identity. Górak-Sosnowska (2007) highlighted the apparent ‘Arabization of Islam’, drawing on market research in 2001 which found a common association between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Islam’ shortly after the 9/11 terror attacks. Nowaczek-Walczak (2011) expanded this area of research by interviewing multiple Arab restaurant owners in Poland’s capital Warsaw, the issue of Arab stereotypes was a thread that united the diverse opinions. The most common and problematising stereotypes concerned the cruelty of Arab husbands and Muslims as

25 Krotofil, Joanna. "‘If I am to be a Muslim, I have to be a good one’. Polish migrant women embracing Islam and reconstructing identity in dialogue with self and others." Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe (2011): 163.
27 European Values Study. 2008. www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu
terrorists. Nowaczek-Walczak added that the Polish media often mentioned Arab countries in the context of human rights abuses, terrorism, and poverty. Buchowski (2016) counters that the Polish media had maintained an ‘indifferent tolerance’ to Muslims domestically until the refugee crisis dominated Polish politics in 2015. The then Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz allowed the Estera foundation to settle 50 Christian families from Syria. In an interview with the Financial Times newspaper, Miriam Shaded, the head of Estera, stated that Muslims believe the ‘same’ as ISIS, adding that people who believe in Islam are criminals who follow a totalitarian belief structure. Within a year, a vast majority of Syrian Christian refugees, brought over by the Estera foundation had left Poland. Konrad Pędziwiatr (2015) argued that the populist conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party broke with tradition and politicised this so-called refugee crisis for electoral gain in the October 2015 elections. The anti-refugee rhetoric increased following the terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015.

A chronology of Islamophobic incidents in Poland that year demonstrates how some exploited international events to attack Islamic institutions, including an attack on a mosque in Poznań, shortly after the Charlie Hebdo terror attacks in Paris in January 2015. Pędziwiatr and Narkowicz, writing in openDemocracy, also highlighted how sections of the Polish media grew more brazen and explicitly Islamophobic with front covers that racialised the refugee crisis.

Polling of European countries in 2016 found that negative views of minorities and refugees were commonplace. Negative views of Muslims were widespread in Italy (69%), Hungary (72%), and Poland (69%). It is perhaps unsurprising that almost a quarter of Poles interviewed expressed negative opinions towards Jewish communities. Ideological leanings to the right were indicators of increased unfavourability towards Muslims. To understand this topic in more depth, researchers constructed an index based relating to national identity, which included questions about language and being Christian. The most restrictive views came from Hungary, Greece, Poland, and Italy. The importance of religion in nationality is also a partisan issue, with a stark divide between the left and right in Poland on this issue. People who expressed unfavourable views were also more likely to agree that refugees pose a threat. For example, just over half of Poles polled who expressed favourable views of Muslims had agreed that refugees pose a threat, this jumps to 81% amongst the Poles who

32 Ibid. 120.
37 Ibid. 438.
40 Ibid. 6.
41 Ibid. 11.
42 Ibid. 22.
expressed unfavourable views of Muslims.Outside of Hungary, Poles expressed the most concern (71%) that refugees will increase the risk of domestic terrorism. Almost a third of Poles agreed that Muslims in their country support ISIS, as a similar number declined to answer this question. As with other countries, Poles overwhelmingly agreed that refugees were 'drains' on the welfare system, but more Poles agreed that refugees were no more likely than other groups to commit a crime. Perhaps these factors help explain how many Europeans uniformly overstate the size of their respective Muslim populations. In Poland, researchers found that on average, Poles believed that of every 100 people, seven are Muslim. The reality is that this figure is under 0.1%. Regarding population shifts, Poles believed that Muslims would make up 13% of the population in 2020. Pędziwiatr (2016) attributes this perception gap to the misinformation presented in sections of Polish press and by certain public figures. An example cited by Pędziwiatr included the November-December front cover of the Catholic magazine, Polonia Christiana, which depicted a masked man holding explosives with the caption, 'Immigrants - Caliphate's Fifth Column'. Hate crime figures cited in Pędziwiatr’s report stated that around one-third of hate crime victims were Muslim (250 reports), 12% of victims were Jewish (102 cases), and 7.5% were Romani (65 reports). A high profile hate crime took place near Warsaw when the Chilean pianist was assaulted by a group of skinheads who assumed he was Arab. Muslims were the biggest victims of hate speech in Poland in 2015 despite only accounting for 0.05% of the population, according to an analysis published in the Financial Times in September 2016.

Gawlewicz and Narkowicz (2015) highlight how the rich Islamic history of the region is ignored, demonstrating how this panic is a modern problem, and reflective the political shifts in Poland in recent years, perhaps emboldening some of the individuals this paper will highlight later. Some of them are based in the UK and Poland, and this report will include a more detailed look at the views of Miriam Shaded, mentioned earlier. This next section, however, will touch on the historical interactions between Poles and their settled Muslim population the Tatars.

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43 Ibid. 29.
44 Ibid. 30.
45 Ibid. 32.
47 https://www.opendemocracy.net/caneurope-make-it/kasia-narkowicz-konrad-pedziwiatr/why-are-polish-people-so-wrong-about-muslims-in
49 Ibid. 418.
50 Ibid. 434.
The arrival of Tatars in tied to the Mongols Golden Horde who arrived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 1300s. They were called Polish Tatars or Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, despite their Turkic-speaking and who practised the Hanafi form of Sunni Islam. They soon adapted to their new homeland through military service in exchange for land to settle on and the freedom to practise their faith. In 1569, for example, the parliament of nobility approved the construction of Tatar schools and mosques. By the seventeenth century, 15,000 Tatars settled in 60 villages with mosques in Poland and Lithuania. During a period of great societal flux, there was little evidence of community tensions outside of the destruction of a Tatar mosque in 1609, thanks to the Islamophobic incitement of Catholic priests, and the distribution of an Islamophobic leaflet called Alfurkan tatarski (‘Tatar Alfurqan’). Towards the middle period of this century, census data put the Tatar population above 100,000. Some authors, including Połczyński (2015), have critiqued the national historiographies of cultural harmony with Tatars in this historical juncture, which excludes or overlooks the Lipka Tatar rebellion of 1672, where thousands defected to the Ottoman Empire. King Jan III Sobieski forgave most of the rebels, allowing them to resettle in Polish territory. Szajikowski (1999), meanwhile, noted how Tatar communities were further ‘Polonized’ in the seventeenth century through inter-marriage and the adoption of local vernaculars. Polish Tatars also fought in battles against the Ottoman Empire, famously in the Battle of Vienna on 12 October 1863 and Battle of Parnaky in modern-day Slovakia on 7-8 October 1863. The Third Partition of Poland in 1795 saw the lands of the Tatars absorbed into the Russian Empire. Tatars swore allegiance to Poland on copies of the Qur’an and units of Tatar soldiers took part in various uprisings against Russia. After Poland regained independence in 1918, border changes meant that only a small number of Tatar enclaves remained within Polish territory, with the Tatar population dropping to 5,000 or 5,500. There are examples of Polish Tatar units fighting Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War. In contrast, the Bolsheviks promised an era of ‘Muslim Communism’ in the Caucasus and Central Asia, appointing Tatar Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev the Commissariat for Muslim Affairs. This promise never materialised, and Sultan-Galiev soon fell out of favour with the Bolsheviks, living the life of an outcast, before his arrest and execution on 28 January 1940 in Moscow.

56 Dziekan, Marek M. "History and culture of Polish Tatars." Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe (2011): 27
61 Ibid. 47.
63 Ibid.
During the interwar years, while privileging Catholicism, the Polish state formally recognised Islam in 1936.\(^{68}\) A year earlier, a squadron of Tatarian formed with the religious protection of Dr Ali Woronowicw, an imam in Poland’s capital of Warsaw, who went on to serve as the General Imam of the Polish Army.\(^{69}\) Polish Tatars served in all units of the Polish army during the Second World War.\(^{70}\) Tragedy would befall Tatars scattered in other parts of Europe in this period. In 1944, Stalin ordered the deportation of 200,000 Tatar men, women and children to the Gulag in Siberia and Central Asia.\(^{71}\) Around a third or almost half of the Tatars deported died on route. The totalitarian Soviet state accused the Tatars of collaborating with Nazi Germany, but historians accept that many had little choice but to comply out of fear of reprisal violence.\(^{72}\)

The borders of Poland were redrawn after the Second World War, leaving only two Tatar villages, in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany, inside Polish territory, as others moved to Warsaw. Land seizures by the Soviet Union forced some Tatar communities to relocate within these new borders. The Tatar population within Poland is estimated to have declined from around 5,000 to 3,000-3,5000 in this post-war period.\(^{73}\) Łyszczarz’s research also highlights how parts of the Tatar community moved away from its cultural traditions, perhaps from Islam, and through assimilation to Polish culture, a multifaceted identity was born.\(^{74}\) Others retained their Islamic identity, within this prolonged process of inter-marriage and assimilation. This acceptance means that Tatars often maintain a flexible yet self-disciplined approach to religiosity.\(^{75}\) This flexibility also extends to interfaith dialogue, most noted in the work of the Common Council of Catholics and Muslims (Rada Wspólna Katolików i Muzułmanów).\(^{76}\)

Other Muslim communities suffered under Soviet rule, including the destruction of mosques and the forced exile or killing of religious leaders, according to the Grand Mufti of Lithuania, Ramadan Yaqoob.\(^{77}\) Nor were conditions under Communist control easy for Poland’s Muslim minority. For example, their official public body, the Muslim Religious Union did face intense scrutiny, but other localised projects did spring up in this period.\(^{78}\) During this historical period, where the Communist maintained positive relations with some Muslim-majority states, Poland did see an increase in students arrive in the 1970s and 1980s, with

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\(^{70}\) Svanberg, Ingvar, and David Westerlund. Muslim Tatar Minorities in the Baltic Sea Region. Brill, 2016. 47.


\(^{74}\) Ibid. 58-59

\(^{75}\) Ibid. 58-59.

\(^{76}\) Ibid. 60.


distinct groups of professionals and political refugees arriving in the decade ahead.\textsuperscript{79} Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan immigrants saw Poland as a cheap place to study and work, some returned home, others settled in Poland. In 1990, for example, a new brick-built mosque opened in Gdańsk.\textsuperscript{80} After 1989, many new Muslim groups began to appear in Poland, including the Shiite Association of Muslim Unity, the Association of Muslim Students.\textsuperscript{81}

The Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1994 which resulted in a humiliating defeat of Russian forces in 1996\textsuperscript{82}, saw thousands of Chechyan refugees enter Poland. Buchowski (2016) states that Poland accepted 80,000 such refugees, albeit on a temporary basis, since the conflict began, with many either returning to the Russian Federation or other parts of Europe, with only around 7,000 to 8,000 settling in Poland.\textsuperscript{83} The Society for Threatened Peoples has criticised the Polish state in recent years for its treatment of refugees in Chechnya, including the lack of home visitation from doctors and inadequate medical care for children.\textsuperscript{84} Many Chechens left Poland citing a lack of legal protection or status.\textsuperscript{85}

Warsaw has always been a popular hub for Polish Muslims is now home to several thousand Muslims, with many today from Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, and Chechnya. Others will have converted on their own or through marriage.\textsuperscript{86} Many of the settled communities have taken Polish citizenship and retain a sense of identity which fuses both cultural identities. There are community organisations with Warsaw to support the integration of Somali communities, who, despite their small numbers, have gained a disproportionate focus in the Polish media on incidents abroad, with a large number of news articles focusing on piracy and poverty and terrorism.\textsuperscript{87} The Foundation for Somalia, in Warsaw, offers free Polish language courses but are often over-subscribed and unable to meet demand.\textsuperscript{88} Many speak of the systemic barriers of racial discrimination that make it hard to find meaningful work, and for refugees, the financial support is meagre, with stipends ending two months after a successful application.\textsuperscript{89}

If the sections above illuminated a sense of the history of Islam in Poland and its rich diversity today, the next small section will detail the importance of engaging and empowering

\textsuperscript{79} Pędziwiatr, Konrad. "The Established and Newcomers" in Islam in Poland or the intergroup relations within the Polish Muslim Community." Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe (2011): 172.

\textsuperscript{80} Nalborczyk, Agata S. "Mosques in Poland. Past and present." Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe (2011): 186.


\textsuperscript{87} Walczak, Gawel. "Muhammad in Warsaw, or a few words about Warsaw's Somalis." Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe (2011): 142-143.


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
Polish communities within Britain against anti-Muslim narratives, supporting Polish Muslims in Britain, and working towards a more tolerant and pluralistic goal.

Since the ascension of Poland to the European Union in 2004, one of the largest migratory shifts in Europe has occurred between the UK and Poland. A subsequent research has explored how attitudes towards Muslim people are shaped and reproduced through international mobility. A key finding in this research is that Polish migrants often discussed their attitudes, be it positive or negative, with family members or peers. In one example, researchers noted how a woman had internalised her brother’s anti-Muslim views about Muslims in England despite her lack of contact with Muslims in Poland. The mobility of Islamophobia, as argued by Gawlewicz and Narkowicz (2015), demonstrates how ideas proliferate beyond traditional borders within intimate familial and peer environments, which is why the section below will identify key ideologues of concern for Polish communities both here in the UK and in Poland.

The surprise election of the ultra-conservative Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in October 2015 demonstrates the reinvigorated role of Catholicism in political and public life in a country where 90% of the population identify with the church. The PiS secured 235 seats in the 460-seat lower house of Poland’s parliament, securing a ruling majority, and a desire to reshape Polish society through the lens of traditional Catholic conservative morality. Some PiS supporters saw their vote as a religious choice not driven by politics. The illiberal impulses of this form of populism have resulted in the purging of state-run corporations, the seizure of the secret service, and the neutering of the nation’s highest court. The purge has extended to the country’s state-run media and radio outlets. Opposition press saw a fall in their advertising revenue as the PiS attempts to affirm the position of the Polish-run press in opposition to the privately-run and German-owned media which did command a larger market share in 2015. Amid great public opposition to such

92 Ibid. 95-96.
93 Ibid. 96.
94 Ibid. 96-97.
100 Ibid.
changes, the Press Freedom Index has ranked Poland 54 in 2017, down from 46 a year earlier.\textsuperscript{101}

Some, however, are benefiting from this sea change in the country’s political landscape. The government allocated a 26m zloty ($6.8m) payment linked to a controversial Catholic priest, Tadeusz Rydzyk heads the ultra-conservative Catholic radio show \textit{Radio Maryja}, which has a long history of promoting antisemitism\textsuperscript{102} and Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{103} In 2001, Rydzyk endorsed the League of Polish Families (LPR), an ethnocentrist extreme right-wing party, which helped them gain seats in the subsequent election.\textsuperscript{104} Students at a journalism school run by Mr Rydzyk told the \textit{Financial Times} that they anticipate finding jobs much easier in this reconstructed media landscape, which will respect ‘Christian values’ and strengthen family values.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{The Politicisation of Catholicism}

Catholicism, since the start of the twentieth century, became intertwined with Polish national identity, and an ‘essential pillar’ of the Polish character.\textsuperscript{106} The competing political visions of Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski, one of multicultural nationalism and Catholicism in opposition to the use of Catholicism to justify a more homogenous society, both ideas came to define the national debate in the country in the interwar years (1918-1939).\textsuperscript{107} Catholic antisemitism was prevalent in Polish political discourses in this period. Hagen (1996) outlined that Polish antisemitism in this interwar period bore the hallmarks of ‘Catholic intolerance and the desperation-driven aggression of pre-industrial peasants and artisans’.\textsuperscript{108} Antisemitism was the tool to disenfranchise Jewish communities socially, economically, and sometimes violently with the rise of the radical right, but such acts of antisemitic violence had widespread social acceptance, demonstrating the latent prejudice within Polish society.\textsuperscript{109} Berend (2001) states that Dmowski’s National Democratic Party, which welded itself to the extreme right in Poland, was one of the first parties in Europe to advocate antisemitic policies, an economic boycott and organised anti-Jewish pogroms.\textsuperscript{110}

Dmowski’s position as Foreign Minister gave succour to a movement he formed with other antisemites who attempted to institutionalise antisemitism through pseudoscience in 1923.\textsuperscript{111} The political coup in May 1926 ushered in an era of conservative authoritarianism under the

\begin{thebibliography}{111}
\bibitem{103} “Poland: An Inconvenient Truth.” “Financial Times. Last modified May 1, 2016. \url{https://www.ft.com/content/4344ca44-0b94-11e6-9cd4-2be898308be3}.
\bibitem{104} Pankowski, Rafal. The populist radical right in Poland: The patriots. Routledge, 2010. 111.
\bibitem{105} “Poland: An Inconvenient Truth.” “Financial Times. Last modified May 1, 2016. \url{https://www.ft.com/content/4344ca44-0b94-11e6-9cd4-2be898308be3}.
\bibitem{106} Pankowski, Rafal. The populist radical right in Poland: The patriots. Routledge, 2010. 25.
\bibitem{108} Hagen, William W. "Before the" final solution": Toward a comparative analysis of political anti-Semitism in interwar Germany and Poland." The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 2 (1996): 360.
\bibitem{109} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
leadership of Pilsudski. Within months, his political rival Dmowski had announced a new, secretive political party modelled on the Ku Klux Klan. The motto of this new party read ‘Catholic religion, Polish nationality and dominance of Poles’. Within a year, Dmowski, who pushed for the economic boycott of Jewish communities since 1912, stated that his slogan for upcoming election would be ‘Boycott the Jews’. Despite the fervent antisemitism, ethnonationalists in Poland defined themselves in opposition to Hitler and Germany, by promoting their Catholic values and apparent rejection of scientific racism. The Pilsudski government and his successors implemented various antisemitic policies due to the confident and vocal opposition to the extreme and radical right. Some policies were still on the agenda as the Second World War began in 1939. The creation of the National Radical Camp (Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny, or ONR) fractured the unity of the antisemitic nationalist bloc in the Polish Senate, Dmowski, now the chief spokesman for this Endeks bloc attempted to curtail the growth of the ONR but never fully condemned their pro-Nazi machinations. In a few short months, the ONR had recruited a few thousand young men, holding uniformed marches with military discipline in cities like Warsaw, while its militia wing carried out acts of intimidation and violence. Polish socialists took to the streets in opposition.

The assassination of Bronisław Pieracki, Minister of the Interior, in June 1934 by members of the far-right OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists), however, became a pretext for a government clampdown on the activities of the ONR. Within weeks, the government formally banned the ONR for inciting racial hatred and its threat to public security. The Polish state went on to imprison political opponents from the left and right in the Bereza Kartuska internment camp in 1934. Others have likened Bereza Kartuska to a concentration camp. Prisoners included those affiliated to the offshoots of the ONR, including a pro-Franco Falangist group.

115 Ibid. 361.
118 Ibid. 25-26.
The death of Pilsudski intensified aspects of Polish antisemitism, not just in its institutionalised discrimination which was state policy since the 1920s, but in paroxysms of violence. Examples of antisemitic violence included how local newspapers in the city Rybnik, in the Polish part of Upper Silesia, mirrored Nazi propaganda, which resulted in an anti-Jewish riot against the 150 members of the Jewish community in a population of 25,000. A bomb destroyed the clinical and medical offices of the Jewish Red Cross in Grodno as a bombing of a synagogue in Sosnowiec caused structural damage, but caused no injuries. In August 1936, a court in eastern Poland jailed twenty Jews for participating in a general strike following the verdict in the Przytyk pogrom trial. The courts had, in essence, blamed Jewish communities for the violence, with disproportionate prison sentences for Jewish individuals who fought back in self-defence, as thirty-nine of the forty-three Poles responsible for the violence were freed or given light sentences. In that one year alone, there were 348 anti-Jewish incidents, including 21 mass attacks on Jewish communities, with far-right nationalists blamed for the murder of three Jewish people in Białystok, in northeastern Poland. One such example included a pogrom in Wysokie Mazowieckie, between Białystok and Warsaw, which left over fifty Jews injured. Again, the source of the violence came from the extreme right nationalists in the Endeks.

The government created the Camp of National Unity (OZON) to counter the rise of the radical and extreme right. OZON, however, served to draft antisemitic legislation similar to the polices Germany, Romania, and Hungary passed throughout the 1930s. By 1937, the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe), declared the Jews to be its 'chief enemy' and that 'its main aim and duty must be to remove the Jews from all spheres of social, economic, and cultural life in Poland'. On the eve of war in 1939, at an ideological level, the antisemitic pronouncements of the extreme right, the Catholic Church, and the Polish government were almost interchangeable. This focus on the extreme far-right in this period of Polish history is important, not just for historical memory, but how Polish society must reconcile its past, based on cycles of antisemitism and the sometimes violent treatment of its Jewish communities where ethnonational antisemitism was state policy, driven not just by Dmowski and his Endeks. The ONR while short-lived, proved popular enough to concern Dmowski, who feared a fracture in ethnonationalist circles, but their collective pressure, be it through violence on the country’s streets, or through political lobbying, forced the Pilsudski regime to adopt anti-Jewish legislation. Modern versions of the ethnonationalist radical and extreme

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131 Ibid. 371.
132 Ibid. 374.
right, the National-Radical Camp (ONR), the National Movement (RN) and the All-Polish Youth (MW), are derived from the groups active before the Second World War.\textsuperscript{133} Amnesty International described the All-Polish Youth as an ‘extremist homophobic grouping’\textsuperscript{134} after members attacked individuals at LGBT rallies in Poland in 2005 and 2006. Human Rights Watch penned an open letter to the President of Poland to condemn the anti-LGBT violence and abuse.\textsuperscript{135}

**Catholicism & Ethno-nationalism under Communism**

Communist regimes across Europe enshrined the pre-existing ethno-nationalism in legal and political frameworks. It resulted in the privileging of ethnic homogeneity which created a hostile environment for Polish Jews, resulting in the forced emigration of 15-20,000 in 1968 and 1969, consolidating a framework that the modern far-right exploit in Poland.\textsuperscript{136} Another key factor in the deep political divides in Polish society concerned the role of the Catholic Church, not just under communism, but its overreaching hand in post-Solidarity politics in the 1990s. Under Communism, the Catholic Church positioned itself as a mediator between Polish citizenry and the regime, affirming its position as a guardian of Polish identity and moral life, which according to Prizel, despite facing state oppression, the Church did not adopt revolutionary ideas like liberation theology.\textsuperscript{137} The Catholic Church in Poland was able to identify the struggle for national survival with Catholicism, positioning the church as a protective figure against national assault.\textsuperscript{138}

Some have even speculated about the role of Poland’s first Pope, John Paul II in the fall of communism\textsuperscript{139}, as other Polish priests aligned with the pro-democracy Solidarity movement, sometimes at a personal cost.\textsuperscript{140} The fall of Communism in Poland presented the church with an opportunity to increase its influence in the political sphere.\textsuperscript{141} The presidential elections in 1995 demonstrate how the Catholic Church in Poland demanded a candidate ‘who will defend ethical and evangelical values’, endorsing a candidate with little political traction, and therefore switching support to the incumbent President Wałęsa. Various archbishops attacked his rival candidate, attacking his secular attitudes, and apparent

Godlessness, linking him directly to Marx and Lenin.\textsuperscript{142} Some in the church equated Wałęsa's eventual electoral defeat with the 'moral sickness' of secular politics, concluding that only a theocracy could be morally healthy.\textsuperscript{143} A major debate in Poland a year later demonstrated how the Church began to view itself as a 'nation-forming Church' with the capacity to veto issues like abortion.\textsuperscript{144} Such political interventions had deeper, lasting consequences in Poland. It created a symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism which deepened socio-cultural divides.\textsuperscript{145}

Nor had elements of the church addressed the antisemitic attitudes of some priests. Most notably, in 1995, Father Henryk Jankowski, a hero of the Solidarity movement a decade earlier, declared that Jews had a role in Nazism and communism, and were responsible for the injustices of capitalism, was later disciplined by the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{146} The fiftieth anniversary of Auschwitz death camp did change more general attitudes towards Jewish communities among Poles.\textsuperscript{147} Father Jankowski once decorated his church at Easter with the slogan 'The Jews killed Jesus and the prophets and persecuted us as well'.\textsuperscript{148} This Church-affiliated form of antisemitism proliferated in the post-communist era thanks to the success of Radio Maryja in 1991, which was highlighted earlier in the report. At its height, the radio show attracted over 10\% of Poles, but its audience shares have declined somewhat.\textsuperscript{149} The power, and enduring appeal for its listeners to talk to the radio show and express their antisemitic views without censure, despite the hosts going to great lengths to not broadcast or refer to overt antisemitic and xenophobic discourses. Rather, the show goes to great lengths to equate the suffering of the Jews with that of Poland, which propagates an exclusionary form of nationalism that has Catholicism at its core.\textsuperscript{150} If sections of wider Polish society could resist such forms of antisemitism, the extreme right, however, embraces it.\textsuperscript{151,152} Their hatred of communism and capitalism recycles antisemitic discourses around Freemasonry which fuses with an innately violent desire to remove perceived cultural threats from society.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. 107.
\item\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. 108.
\item\textsuperscript{146} East, Roger, and Jolyon Pontin. Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Revised Edition. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016. 27.
\item\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{149} Rosenfeld, Alvin H., ed. Resurgent antisemitism: Global perspectives. Indiana University Press, 2013.258-259.
\item\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. 259-260.
\item\textsuperscript{152} Ramet, Sabrina P., ed. Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. Penn State Press, 2010. 89.
\item\textsuperscript{153} Pankowski, Rafal, and Marcin Kormak. "Radical nationalism in Poland: From theory to practice." RIGHT-WING IN EUROPE (2013): 159.
\end{itemize}
The extreme right did find parliamentary representation under the banner of the League of Polish Families, which gained 7.87% of the vote in 2001.\(^{154}\) In May 2006, it was a junior coalition partner with the Law and Justice party (PiS).\(^{155}\) Pankowski and Kormak (2013) argue that the PiS had absorbed this far-right surge by appealing to their illiberal desires.\(^{156}\) A strategic alliance between Radio Maryja and the PiS helped get far-right activists elected to parliament between 2007 and 2011.\(^{157}\) During this period, the Independence Day marches organised by the All-Polish Youth and the National Radical Camp became a key focus for far-right activism. In 2012, for example, riots broke out in Warsaw,\(^{158}\) and the event brought together far-right nationalists from a range of European countries.\(^{159}\) A year later and police detained seventy-two far-right protesters as the violence left twelve police officers and nineteen protesters injured.\(^{160}\) The National Independence Day march in 2014 passed without incident until a large group of masked men separated from the main crowds and attacked police officers.\(^{161}\) According to reports, police arrested over 276 protesters in violence which left fifty officers injured.\(^{162}\) It was the fourth successive year where violence has occurred during the march.\(^{163}\) The National Independence Day march of 2015 drew 35,000 to Warsaw, in what the Financial Times described it as the far-right’s show of strength.\(^{164}\) Representatives from the antisemitic Jobbik party of Hungary attended, as did members of Italy’s neo-fascist Forza Nuova.\(^{165}\) The protesters marched under the banner of the antisemitic pre-war slogan "Poland for Poles. Poles for Poland."\(^{166}\) A year later and the Interior Ministry estimated that 75,000 people joined the march, while Warsaw’s city hall put the figure at 60,000 as counter-protests drew between 10,000 and 27,000, according to local

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\(^{157}\) Ibid.


\(^{164}\) “Polish Nationalists Rail Against Brussels in Show of Strength." Financial Times. Last modified November 11, 2015. [https://www.ft.com/content/67618b9e-8893-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896](https://www.ft.com/content/67618b9e-8893-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896).

\(^{165}\) Ibid.

estimates. The 2017 march made international headlines after 60,000 attended the march. Various media outlets had to correct their coverage after erroneous reports suggested that protesters had unveiled a banner which read ‘Pray for an Islamic Holocaust’ on a bridge. The banner was hung from a bridge in the western city of Poznań in 2015. EU lawmakers expressed their concerns about the scale of the nationalist rally, forcing some within the ruling PiS party to condemn the racist banners but Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski denied witnessing any antisemitic banners at the march. Polish authorities have now launched an investigation into whether or not statements from the far-right groups present on the march had breached laws on propagating racism. The offences are punishable by up to two years in prison. Michael Schudrich, the country’s chief rabbi, had a ‘frank’ talk with ruling party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and according to a statement released by the Jewish community of Poland, Kaczynski had ‘strongly opposed’ the statements on display.

In late November, vandals broke around a dozen windows at a mosque in Warsaw. Youssef Chadid, a community leader, told the media that it was a racist, anti-Muslim attack, adding that an ‘unfavourable’ climate in Poland towards Muslims and called on the government to condemn anti-Muslim attacks. Leaders of Poland’s Jewish community wrote to mufti Tomasz Miśkiewicz to condemn the group’s actions. In late November, vandals broke around a dozen windows at a mosque in Warsaw. Youssef Chadid, a community leader, told the media that it was a racist, anti-Muslim attack, adding that an ‘unfavourable’ climate in Poland towards Muslims and called on the government to condemn anti-Muslim attacks. Leaders of Poland’s Jewish community wrote to mufti Tomasz Miśkiewicz to condemn the group’s actions.

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174 Ibid.
Notable anti-Muslim activists in Poland and Britain

The section below will briefly discuss some of the important or notorious anti-Muslim ideologues and groups in Poland and the United Kingdom.

Miriam Shaded

Miriam Shaded, mentioned earlier in the report, was behind the attempted settlement of fifty Christian Syrian refugees in Poland in 2015, but most would leave Poland within months.\(^{177}\) She made various anti-Muslim remarks when interviewed in the *Financial Times* which included the claim that many who practice Islam are ‘criminals’.\(^{178}\)

The exodus of Christians from the Middle East, however, is of grave concern, with vast populations fleeing war and genocide in Syria and Iraq.\(^{179}\) Between 1910 and 2010, the Christian population in the Middle East dropped from 14% to a mere 4%.\(^{180}\) Experts cite violence, forced deportations, and discrimination as the drivers of this dramatic population shift. Irrespective of this fact, the anti-Muslim views of Ms Shaded are easy to find on her social media accounts, where she boats almost 70,000 ‘likes’ on Facebook, with a less popular English-language page gaining several hundred ‘likes’. Mainstream Polish media, like *TVP1*, owned by the national public broadcaster have given her a public platform,\(^{181}\) and she has also spoken to other Polish media outlets, like *wRealu24*, about the alleged links between Islam and paedophilia.\(^{182}\)

Shaded has expressed support for Viktor Orbán’s proposed ban on Islam in Hungary.\(^{183}\) In other media, she said that the Qur’an is a book that calls for ‘hatred and violence’ and that the concept of Jihad is one of force and submission.\(^{184}\) She appeared on the cover of the Polish weekly magazine *Wprost* in 2016, an English-language translation of this interview was uploaded online on 20 March 2016.\(^{185}\) She used this interview to call for a ban on Islam in Poland, to praise the Assad regime for its liberal protection of Christians, including her relatives, and to warn that if ‘Europe does not quickly wake up, it becomes Islamized’. She added that imams are instructing refugee men to enter Europe to conquer the region and

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spread Islam.  

She praised Wprost for not ‘manipulating’ her views on Facebook, adding, ‘Ban Islam – let us defend ourselves, as long as it’s not too late’ on 7 March 2016. She reinforced this argument in a promotional clip for an interview with the founder and former leader of the English Defence League Tommy Robinson on 15 November 2017. She has also made headlines after boycotting a bottled water company which had used a crescent moon and stars to denote camping in its branding. The conservative Do Rzeczy magazine put her on their front cover last September, which she encouraged supporters to purchase on her official Instagram page.

Piotr Rybak

The extremes of ethnonationalist fringe in Poland have gained notoriety in recent years, most notably in the actions of Piotr Rybak, of the Wielka Polska Niepodległa movement. In November 2015, during an anti-Muslim protest in Wroclaw against Poland accepting Syrian refugees, Rybak burned an effigy of an Orthodox Jewish man. During the protest, most of which was captured on video and uploaded to YouTube, Rybak said, ‘we will not bring a single Muslim into Poland, Poland is for Poles.’ He then set fire to the effigy, which featured an EU flag.

National Radical Camp organised the protest and presented Rybak with the effigy to burn, but the courts rejected his claim that the effigy was of Hungarian-American Jewish philanthropist George Soros, finding him guilty of ‘public incitement to hatred on the grounds of religion and nationality to an unspecified group of Jews by burning an effigy’. The prison sentence given to Rybak fell to three months after an appeal. He is now threatening to sue Jewish leaders who called him ‘a fascist, antisemite and stinking nationalist’ in September 2017.

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186 Ibid.
unnamed Polish activist were detained in Birmingham airport hours before the event took place. Edwin Wagensveld, who leads the Netherlands chapter of the Islamophobic Pegida movement, was also prevented from attending.  

Jacek Międlar

The notoriety of the disgraced former priest Jacek Międlar grew after he was detained at Stansted Airport to prevent him from attending a far-right rally in Telford, Shropshire in February 2017.196 Międlar, 28, is an important fixture in the extreme right-wing political scene in Poland, and in Wrocław in west Poland.197 Two years earlier, Międlar spoke at the far-right organised nationalist demonstration which marked the anniversary of Poland’s independence after the First World War. Organisers claimed that 50,000 attended but police put the actual figure at 25,000 people.198 Międlar’s contrasted the love of Christianity with the apparent violence in Islam, he told the crowd, ‘We do not want violence, we do not want aggression in the name of Allah…. We must oppose it. We do not want the hatred that is in the Koran’.199 On the Polish Independence Day march on 11 November 2016, Międlar is alleged to have publicly called for hatred against Jews and Ukrainians.200 During the march, he is alleged to have said, ‘We must be strong in spirit, body, in our mentality and knowledge, because only we will be able to win with the left, with Jewry, and with communism, which is still in our homeland’.201 Months earlier, prosecutors dropped a hate crime investigation against Międlar, when during his sermon, described Jews as a ‘cancer’.202 He is also alleged to have uploaded a photo of Poles performing a Nazi salute during a pogrom in the southern town of Myślenice in 1936 which resulted in non-lethal violence and property damage to Jewish-owned businesses.203204205 Międlar has blogged


197 Ibid.


201 Ibid.


about the ‘Holocaust industry’ and denies Poland’s role in the Holocaust,206 yet he chose to lionise Witold Pilecki on the sixty-ninth anniversary of his death.207 Pilecki is a national hero in Poland, a man who, in 1940, snuck into Auschwitz to document the genocidal horrors of the Holocaust. He spent two and a half years inside the camp before his escape.208 As Timothy Snyder noted in the New York Times, Pilecki’s ‘definition of Polish identity was one of honor and dishonor’, not the ethnonationalism so widespread in his homeland.209 Upon his return to his homeland, Pilecki found himself before the courts, accused of being an imperialist spy. The show trial soon ‘exposed’ his guilt, and his execution took place ten days later. The post-Solidarity government exonerated Pilecki in 1990.210 As discussed earlier, the extreme right’s rejection of communism derives from antisemitism211, meaning that Międlar’s lionising of Pilecki serves to reinforce a mythologised form of nationhood where only the violent purging of so-called Jewish and other foreign influences can resolve this perpetual narrative of victimhood.

Marian Kowalski

Marian Kowalski came to prominence in the English-language media in 2015 following a series of counter-protests following his speaking tour in Ireland during his failed presidential campaign in Poland.212 Hotels in Dublin and Cork cancelled speaking events for Kowalski, who represents the far-right National Movement (Ruch Narodowy). In Dublin, the Irish Times reported that sixty anti-fascist protesters were involved in scuffles in the Ormond Quay area of the city, but police denied any such incidents had taken place.213 The local press also reported that Ruch Nardowy has a chapter in Cork and members across Ireland.214 Kowalski was once a spokesperson for the National Radical Camp (ODR).215 A year earlier, on 9 April 2014, Ruch Narodowy brought together a host of far-right speakers from across Europe, in

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214 Ibid.

an event near the Polish parliament in Warsaw. Marton Gyongyosi, one of the leaders of the antisemitic and anti-Roma, Jobbik in Hungary, was a keynote speaker for a crowd of around 150 largely white men in their 30s to 40s. Other extreme right parties from Bulgaria and Croatia were in attendance, where topics included conspiracies about Jewish communities and the European Union.

The far-right have adopted other tactics to disrupt liberal events, where topics included equal marriage and leading feminist academics in 2013, which drew praise from Artur Zawiska, who sat on the leadership of the National Movement.

Kowalski’s views towards the building of new mosques in Poland reflects how anti-Muslim racism is often anti-Arab in focus. In a 2016 speech, he is reported to have told a crowd that Arab-funded mosques are ‘breeding grounds’ for terrorists. On Facebook, he shared a meme about how Poland violently dealt with the ‘invasion’ of Islam on 20 May 2017. On Twitter, Kowalski compared Islam to a ‘trojan horse’. On 25 September 2016, he photographed a small rally in Trafalgar Square in London which called for the release of Janusz Waluś, a Polish white supremacist, who, in 1993, murdered the anti-apartheid hero and SACP leader Chris Hani. Waluś was a member of the leading neo-Nazi group in South Africa, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, who hoped his actions would trigger a race war in the final days of apartheid.

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217 Ibid.


219 Ibid.


Kowalski has also gained a reputation for his provocative stunts which included the burning of a rainbow flag in July 2015 following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling to legalise same-sex marriage.226

On the refugee issue, he used his Idź Pod Prąd TV platform to label refugees as ‘monkeys,’ and suggested that individuals who support refugees require a ‘punch in the face’. He added that politicians who accept refugees should be ‘eliminated’ from public life.227

Thanks to pressure from members of the Polish community in Britain, Ealing Police and Ealing Council prevented Kowalski from speaking at a Polish restaurant in Ealing, west London on 18 October 2017.228

Rafal Pankowski, an academic from the anti-racism charity ‘Never Again’, told the BBC that the UK far-right is trying to recruit Poles domestically following a perceived rise in far-right activity in Poland.229 Therefore, it is no accident that Britain First has tried and failed to bring over the likes of Jacek Międlar and Piotr Rybak to speak at rallies, given that Poles form the largest migrant community in Britain.230 One such example is Marian Lukasik, 61, a prominent Britain First supporter, who called for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to be ‘shot to pieces’ for letting Iraqi and Syrian refugees into Germany.231 A YouTube video uploaded by Britain First deputy leader Jayda Fransen features Lukasik, who warns viewers about ‘Islamisation’ and the ‘ritual rape’ of white girls.232

The self-styled reporter Weronika Kania, who has contributed one hundred posts to the Polish-language anti-Islamisation website NDIE, was active in interviewing members of Britain First before her videos disappeared from YouTube. She spoke at a Britain First rally on 28 July 2017.233 On Facebook, she briefly updated her cover photo in praise of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán in 2015. Recent Facebook posts have promoted Tommy Robinson’s controversial new book and linked to a YouTube concerning the paedophilia and Islam.234 She has also interviewed Jayda Fransen, the deputy leader of Britain First.235

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227 https://twitter.com/_kowalskimarian/status/902176035105538048
Piotr Szlachtowicz hosts the online radio show ‘The Nowy Polski Show’. It sponsored an event in Slough which listed Jacek Międlar as a keynote speaker.\(^{236}\) The event celebrated the underground Polish army which fought in anti-communist resistance movements. Międlar, of course, was denied entry into the UK.\(^{237}\) Another event promoted by his radio show featured the Polish MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke, who, in 2015, was suspended from the European Parliament for ten days after performing a Nazi salute.\(^{238}\) He has also claimed that Hitler ‘probably’ did not know about the Holocaust and the murder of millions of people was not his ‘goal’.\(^{239}\) Korwin-Mikke used racial the epithet ‘n-----’ in 2014\(^{240}\) and was suspended this year after making sexist remarks in parliament.\(^{241}\) An interview with Korwin-Mikke was uploaded by Mateusz Jaronski on 18 July 2017.\(^{242}\) The Twitter feed of the Nowy Polski Show, has, on multiple occasions, posted tweets favourable of the leadership of the far-right political party Britain First.\(^{243,244,245}\)

The British chapter of the openly neo-Nazi National Rebirth of Poland, Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (NOP), made headlines in September 2016, after its members worked in conjunction with the neo-Nazi terrorist group National Action to feed homeless people in Glasgow and Yorkshire.\(^{246}\) The ‘White Rescue: Charity Campaign for Europeans’ campaign is said to have reached other cities like Exeter.\(^{247}\) The story emerged again in 2017, with the president of the Catholic mission where the soup kitchens were held, confirmed to the Daily

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Record newspaper that it would ban the group. Members of the British chapter of the NOP also coordinated this campaign with the National Front in London in April 2017. The NOP has endured in Poland since its founding in 1981, entering mainstream politics in 2001, with little success. The NOP also broadly aligns with the positions of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, according to their president, Adam Gmurczyk. Its UK chapter, has, according to anti-fascism group Hope not Hate, been active since 2010, attracting around 100 members. A handful of their activists have held anti-abortion protests outside of medical centres in London and Doncaster, distributing propaganda printed in English. A YouTube video of their anti-EU campaigning during the EU referendum includes an antisemitic banner which reads ‘Stop Jewish Crimes’. The NOP may have benefited financially from programmatic advertising on YouTube, an investigation in The Times revealed. Polish neo-Nazis, linked to the NOP, from Emigrants United London (Zjednoczeni Emigranci Londyn) attacked individuals at a music festival in Tottenham, north London, in the summer of 2014. The resulting violence left an anti-fascist campaigner with stab wounds and a Jewish man having his kippah knocked from his head.

Marian Kowalski took inspiration from Hungary to encourage the creation of various Idź Pod Prąd civic groups in Poland and abroad. Members are encouraged to socialise, to promote Idź Pod Prąd locally, and do group activities, political or otherwise. For example, the London group has repaired the gravestone of a Polish war veteran. Two admins for the Birmingham group have posed with air rifles on their social media pages. Many of the admins for the Yorkshire group seem to reside in Poland. Other groups boast very little online activity and little engagement from a small membership pool. While Idź Pod Prąd boasts of over twenty groups in the UK alone, this figure must also attract scrutiny.

Conclusion

We should stress, however, that many of the UK-based activists mentioned in this paper, their reach, is, at best, minimal in Polish communities. A deeper concern is the role of the far-right in Britain and Poland which has sought to sow division with its efforts to bring over extremist speakers to the UK, and in some examples, speakers from the UK have attended events in Poland. By drawing on discourses that are more mainstream presents a challenge beyond the solutions proposed in this paper. Rather, this paper seeks to encourage dialogue and promote counter-narratives about more painful aspects of Polish history, and the positive interactions between Catholics and Muslims in the country. Interfaith dialogue among Poles who are Jewish, Muslim, and Catholic will help broaden the discussion about such issues. Faith Matter can help facilitate such dialogue through community and interfaith events and the use of social media. Future research will expand on some of the issues raised, conscious of how quickly politics changes, and in response to the needs of the Poles who seek to challenge the perceived growth of far-right in their communities. Faith Matters is indebted to these voices, not just for their translation of materials but in helping to prevent Marian Kowalski from speaking in London. The long-term plan will include community engagement events and training for interested community members around social media skills and how to facilitate conflict resolution.